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To Where Does One
Attach the Horses?
By AARON D. TwEsia*
After digesting the most recent addition to Kentucky conflicts
literature, Foster v. Leggett,' I was reminded of an apocryphal
story related to me by my father many years ago. In the small
hamlet of Hornistapol, Russia, the first railroad tracks had been
laid and all the townspeople came out to see the new modem
marvel-the steam locomotive. A simple townsman stood watch-
ing this awesome contraption and wondered aloud how this piece
of machinery really worked. The town scholar seeking to educate
the townsman to the twentieth century took pains to explain the
entire operation at great length. He told him that wood and coal
were burned in part of the cabin and that water was heated to
steam and that steam pressure built up and, properly channelled,
it caused the axles to churn and the wheels to move. The towns-
man listened attentively and nodded knowingly and then when
the scholar was finished with his elaborate lecture he said, "Yes,
yes, this is all fine but tell me-to where does one attach the
horses?"
At the time, if I recall correctly, my father was attempting to
convince a rather impetutous young man that educating people
to new ideas is a rather difficult task. It requires more than
arranging words next to each other in a logical sequence so that
they are intelligible as sentences. Words, as the conveyors of
ideas, must penetrate deeply into the psyche before they have
their impact. Otherwise, the student will parrot the words but
will still seek to "attach the horses." The decision of the Kentucky
Court in Foster is one more in the long tradition of conflicts
decisions which are based on an orientation to decision making
which in the opinion of this author is peculiar to conflicts juris-
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. A.B., Beth Medrash Elyon; B.S.,
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1965, Marquette University; Teaching Fellow,
1966-67, Harvard Law School.
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prudence. From the regime of lex loci, to interest analysis, to
most significant contacts there has been in evidence a most dis-
turbing syndrome. The courts look for and find some theory,
some gimmick to decide conflict cases-become wedded to the
theory and then proceed to decide the case. Justice, fairness,
evenhandedness-values which affect decision making in almost
every substantive area of the law-are somehow forgotten. That
a conflicts case might require what Professor Kegel has called
"conflicts justice"2 just as a tort case would require tort justice
is viewed as unimportant. The decisions do not deign to speak
in those terms. It is evident that this author's evaluation of the
majority opinion will be a sharply critical one. The result reached
by the court is not disturbing. In fact, to the surprise of some, I
might even agree that I would have decided the case the same
way.3 What disturbs me greatly though is the absence of ele-
mentary reasoning designed to convince the reader of the result.
Formulae and iconic symbols are no substitute for reasoned con-
vincing decisions. The courts are capable of them in every other
area of the law. In conflicts, sound judicial instincts can accom-
plish this selfsame result. At this time of turmoil and revolution
2 Professor Kegel used this phrase in Kegel, The Crisis in Conflict of Laws, 112
REcuEnm DEs CouRs 91 (1964-1I). He states at 184-85: 'What is considered the
best law according to its content, that is, substantively, might be far from the
best spatially .... One must be ready, therefore, to accept the concept of a
specific justice of conflict of laws, as distinguished from the justice of substantive
law." (Final italics are author's). See also Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts Justice, 9
DuQu£SNE L. RtEv. 860 (1971). This author's position is that the two are inex-
tricably woven together, i.e., conflicts justice is heavily tied to the underlying con-
cepts which dominate the substantive law framework of the laws which are inconflict. See text accompanying footnotes 49-54 infra.
SIn an article entitled Enlightened Territorialisr and Professor Cavers-The
Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQuaSNrE L. REV. 373 (1971) [hereinafter cited as En-
lightened Territorialism], this author discussed Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854(Pa. 1970). The case is factually similar to Foster, the subject of this symposium. In
Doth cases the defendant-driver was domiciled in the state which ha a host-guest
statute. In both cases plaintiff was domiciled in a state which followed the com-
mon-law rule providing for liability in cases of ordinary negligence. In both cases
the accident took place in the defendant's home state. The similarity ends at this
point. In Foster the relationship between plaintiff and defendant was heavily Ken-
tucky oriented. The territorial dimensions of the case are slanted toward Kentucky,
the state which follows the common-law rule. See text accompanying footnotes 8-12
infra. In Cipolla, the facts were heavily oriented toward Delaware, the state
with the host-guest statute. Commenting on the essentially Delaware relationship
I took the position that when there was a real relationship between the parties in
the state which had common-law liability I would be willing to apply the common-
law standard rather than the host-guest statute even when defendant was a
domiciliary of the state in which the accident took place. See Enlightened Ter-
ritorialism 388-91. In light of the fact that this is only the second conflict case
with this fact pattern it is most surprising that the court did not even allude to
Cipolla.
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in the conflicts area there is hope that the courts, unshackled at
last from the rigid rules of the first Restatement, will use their
new-found freedom to reason to their results rather than plug
in facts to new formulae. To help foster this rather ambitious
goal I now turn my attention.
THE FOSTER FACTS AND ENOUGH CONTACTS
The background to the Foster-Leggett litigation is of rather
substantial importance to a reasoned conflicts decision. For one
seeking to plug in a conflicts theory, an elaborate development of
the factual pattern would not be necessary. Indeed for some it
might suffice to state the facts in the following manner: Plaintiff,
a domiciliary of a state which has no host-guest statute, was killed
while a passenger in a car driven in the continental United States.
The driver was guilty only of ordinary negligence.4 For others,
it might be relevant to add that defendant was a domiciliary of a
state which has a statute providing that a host is not liable to a
non-paying guest unless injury or death is brought about by the
wanton or willful misconduct of the operator.5 Still others might
find it significant that the accident occurred while the defendant
4B. CuBmuE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in
SELEcTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 184 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Notes]. Currie's position was that if a state had a legitimate interest it must
apply its own law. Although Professor Currie later modified his position somewhat,
Currie The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CoNan,'. PROB. 754, 757-58(1963) [hereinafter cited as Third State], the initial set of facts set forth above
would probably be enough to make the result a foregone conclusion. In most
instances if plaintiff is a domiciliary of a state which has a compensation interest
Professor Seller would find this fact alone sufficient. See Sedler, The Territorial
Imperative Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 Du-QUESNE L. Rtv. 394, 403 (1971). In those situations when defendant is acting in
a socio-economic area distinct from that of plaintiff and defendant's insurer does
not do business in plaintiff's home state, Professor Sedler would agree that de-
fendants protective law should apply. There is little doubt that most of the
Currie disciples would line up for plaintiff on the grounds that the domicile's
corpensation interest is the crucial interest which determines the result. See
Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 BELYN. L. 1REV. 10 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Keating], nd Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for
Progress? Reflections on Reading Cars, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TExAs L.RlEv. 141 (1967).
Thus for all the vaunted enlightenment of interest analysis and its commitment
to close factual analysis it may be that the determination that the state of plaintiff's
domicile has a compensation interest will be both the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the imposition of liability. Note that a single factor will determine
the result. Some may see an analogy in this approach to the rigidity of lex loci. See
text accompanying footnotes 55-61 infra.
5 For those who would weigh the interests and take into account other types of
interstate values, it would be necessary to gauge the interest of defendant's domi-
cile. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CALF. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
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was driving the car in his own home state, and that the host-guest
relationship arose in the domicile of the plaintiff.6
The factual development detailed heretofore would be suf-
ficient for those seeking to apply a rigid theory or rule of law in
deciding a conflicts case. Yet, it seems to me that such a factual
investigation is clearly inadequate. Choice of law cases such as
Foster raise sensitive problems as to the appropriate law to be
applied when people have arranged their lives such that their
fortunes are touched by the jurisprudential systems of two states.
Surely all the facts which give color to their interstate activity
are worthy of consideration. Some will stop reading at this last
sentence. I beg you to go on. This is not a brief for "free law"
or "ad hoc" decision making in a time when most conflict scholars
are clamoring for a rules-oriented approach to bring the courts
out of the never-never land of interest analysis. Rather I invite
the reader to join me in creating an intricate mosaic from the
factual pattern of the Foster case. Hopefully, when we step back
to view the mosaic in its entirety, the pictorial representation will
be a revealing one.
John Leggett and Helen Stringer were close friends who had
been dating for some time.8 They had both been divorced and
had both worked for several years in the same office in Russell,
Greenup County, Kentucky for the C. & 0. Railroad. Mrs.
Stringer had lived all her life in Greenup County, Kentucky. John
Leggett, on the other hand, split his allegiance between Kentucky
and Ohio. He made his home and technical domicile in Ports-
mouth, Ohio. But his connections with Kentucky were strong.
Not only did he work in Kentucky, but he rented a room in Rus-
sell, Kentucky at the YMCA and would stay there two to five
nights a week.9
0 See Chief Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d569, 585, 249 N.E.2d 894, 403 (1969), and his majority opinion in Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoN-
rticT or LAws § 145 and § 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEzmNT (SEc-
oND)]; R. WEnTEAUB, COMMENTARY ON TIE CoNpiacT or LAWs 247-49 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY] and Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 3.
7 See, e.g., Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315
(1972); Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551, 644
1968; and D. CAvEIs, THE CHOiCE-OF-LAw PRocEss 139-203 (1965).
8 484 S.W.2d at 828.
9 Appellant's brief states that appellee Leggett roomed in Kentucky five nights
a week. Brief at 4. Appellee's brief alleges that he stayed in Kentucky on the
average of two nights a week. Brief at 2.
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The day before the fatal accident John and Helen got together
for a game of golf. At that time they planned for the morrow
a day in the big city, Columbus, Ohio, some 100 miles north of
both Russell, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio.'0 In order to get
an early start the next day John spent the night in his room at
the YMCA. The next morning he picked up Helen at her home
and then proceeded on U.S. Highway No. 23 to Columbus, Ohio.
They had planned that John would transact some business and
Helen would do some shopping. They would then get together
for dinner, go to the show or the races, and then return to
Russell the night of the same day. On the way John attempted
to pass another car. It was raining and the roads were wet. In
the process of passing, John lost control of the car and crossed
the median colliding with a vehicle going south on the highway.
Helen Stringer was killed in the collision.
In a suit brought by Carole Foster as administratrix for the
estate of Helen Stringer the problem faced by plaintiff was that
under the law of Ohio she could not recover for the injuries of
the decedent. The defendant, John Leggett, was guilty at most
of ordinary negligence. Under the Ohio host-guest statute there
can be no recovery by the guest against the host unless plaintiff
can prove that the defendant was guilty of wanton and willful
misconduct." The Kentucky rule sets up no such obstacles-
ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant will suffice.12
When one steps back and seeks to evaluate this factual
pattern certain themes come through loud and clear. This case
has "Kentucky" writ over it in large bold letters. 3 It is not that
10 These are estimated distances calculated by the author on the basis of scale
from an atlas.
11 Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Page 1965).
12 See Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
13Professor Reese's symposium comments came to this author's hands after
this manuscript was completed. He has taken the position that Forter is a bard
case which he, on balance, would decide by applying Ohio law. He indicates
that following the rule articulated in Chief Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969), and his majority opinion
in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972), he is led to the
conclusion that Ohio law should apply. The part of the rule applicable to Foster
reads as follows:
When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that
state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held
liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him
under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. 24 N.Y.2d at
585. (Continued on next page)
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the factual contacts are predominantly in Kentucky (although
that is true enough). The parties are both in a sense Ken-
tuckians. The defendant John Leggett, although technically
domiciled in Ohio has spent a significant portion of his time for
the past several years in Kentucky. Not only were his working
hours and relaxing hours spent in Kentucky, but he had also
rented a room so that he could spend more time among his
friends in Kentucky. On the day in question the defendant picked
up his girl friend and entered into a host-guest relationship in
Kentucky (not something to be sneezed at when the issue is
host-guest liability). 14 The trip was to take the plaintiff and
defendant to a place in Ohio which was not home to either of
them. This is not a case of an Ohio defendant driving a Kentucky
plaintiff around the block in defendant's home town.'5 The parties
are both, so to speak, in strange country for the purposes of this
trip. The trip began in Kentucky and was to end there, were it
not for the fatal crash. The relationship, goals and ends of this
trip were oriented to Kentucky from its very inception to its
planned conclusion, shattered only by the realities of an Ohio
accident.
Given the very strong factual connections with Kentucky
one might have expected that the Kentucky Court would have
developed legal reasoning to reflect the strength of the relation-
ship, contacts and expectancies which were centered in Ken-
tucky. They could have evaluated the "interests" or "policy con-
siderations" behind host-guest statutes and then have placed
those policy considerations in interstate perspective by appraising
their importance in light of the heavy centrifugal force which
pulls this case to Kentucky. Instead of a strong evaluative and
reasoned decision the Court decided that Kentucky would apply
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Although Professor Reese would grant the Kentucky court the right to by-pass
this rule by creating an exception when both host and guest reside in the same
state, it is interesting to speculate as to the reason why Professor Reese finds Foster
to be a close case. Is it not perhaps because Judge Fuld's rule is so clear and
provides specifically for the Foster fact situation? If there were no rule setting
forth the result in this fact pattern would Professor Reese find the Foster facts to
be so close, or would he read the fact pattern as this author has suggested (i.e. as
a clear Kentucky case)?
34 Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 3, at 388-90.
15 In such a case there would be broad agreement among many conflicts
scholars that Judge Fuld's rule should prevail. See, Petersen, Weighing Contacts
in Conflicts Cases: The Handmaiden Axiom, 9 DuQuEsNE L. REv. 436, 437 (1971).
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its own law in all instances when it had "enough contacts." 6
The Court thus chose to "attach the horses" to a new rule.
The Kentucky "enough contacts" rule can now take its rightful
place in conflicts history together with such illustrious rules as
lex loci, lex domicilli, lex fori, most significant contacts, interest
analysis and policy-centered analysis. These shorthand expressions
of approaches to the resolution of conflict problems all suffer one
common ill. They are what my colleague Professor Sedler has
aptly called "academic solutions of universal application." 7 De-
fining this term in my own peculiar way I would say that a rule
or theory of universal application in choice of law arises when it
purports to provide a methodology that will resolve all problems
on the basis of a single dominant factor, be it factual or theo-
retical.18 According to this definition, the highly structured, single-
minded approach of interest analysis qualifies it as a rule of uni-
versal application. Indeed when one observes the reasoning of
the "interest analysts" one can only marvel at the new rigidity
they have imposed on the choice of law scene.19 It is little wonder
that courts have moved from the rigid rule of lex loci to the rule
of "enough contacts." They have been led every step of the way
to their detriment by academic commentators who had discovered
"the theory" to resolve the many complex issues in choice of
10 484 S.W.2d at 829.
37 Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 30 (1967). Professor Sedler has used
this term to describe a choice of law rule that will provide a result without regard
to the factual constellation of the case and its interplay with the relevant social
and economic policies found in the supposedly conflicting laws. He would reject,
I am certain, this author's characterization of his position and that of other interest
analysts as rigid. The reader will of necessity make the final judgment as to the
accuracy of the characterization.18Perhaps the "most significant contacts" rule of RESTATEmENT (SECOND) §
145 is not a rule of universal application. This depends on whether the RESTATE-
mENT (SEcoND) sections are read as black letter rules which encourage contact
counting or rather as guides to decision making which include a multiplicity of
factors. The schizophrenic approach of the RESTATE mNT (SEcoND) and the
difference between its black letter statements and the fine analysis in its comments
has been much discussed. See CoMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 209. The concern
remains that judges will pay too much attention to the black letter statements-
witness the approach of Judge Reed dissenting in Foster and his discussion of
RESTA-TE~MENT (SEcoND) § 175. It is not altogether clear that Judge Reed was
contact counting. He expressed true concern that a defendant should never be
held liable while acting in his home state, if the standard of liability in his home
state would exculpate him. He buttresses his decision with a presumption in favor
of application of the lex loci. This is simply a mirror reflection of the majority's
presumption in favor of lex loci. See text accompanying footnotes 23-39 infra.19 See Peterson, Developments in American Conflict of Laws: Torts, 1969 U.
ILL. L.J. 289, 308 (1969).
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law. ° I join Professor Sedler in his call for the courts to return
to the judicial method of deciding cases, only after careful con-
sideration of the fact pattern before the court.2 But for me this
would mean abandoning allegiance to gimmicks and all per-
vasive theories which dictate results without sensitive considera-
tion of all the factual nuances as they develop on the interstate
scenario.
2 2
TAE GIMMICKRY OF INTEREST ANALYsIs AND = FosTER ANALYsIs
Displacing Forum Law
When the court has jurisdiction of the parties its primary
responsibility is to follow its substantive law. The basic law
is the law of the forum, which should not be displaced with-
out valid reasons. 23
So spake the Kentucky Court in defending its conclusion that
in Foster, Kentucky should not abandon its common law rule
when litigating the host-guest issue in a Kentucky court. The
burden of persuasion is thus on the party seeking to displace
forum law to convince the court that the foreign law has a greater
claim to application. I believe it a fair statement that this proposi-
tion has become an article of faith for many policy-centered
theorists. It has become step number one in the analytical ap-
proach they offer.24 And it is a prime example of the rigidity
inherent in the new methodology.
How did this rule develop? What are its origins? Its genesis
I believe can be traced to one of the earlier brilliant writings of
the late Professor Brainerd Currie entitled On the Displacement
of the Law of the Forum.2 5 The touchstone for his discussion was
the now famous case of Walton v. Arabian-American Oil Co.
21
Suit was brought in a federal court in New York, where the
2 0 Notes, supra note 4; Baade, supra note 4; A. EmarnN-mG, A TBEAmsE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 309 (1962).
21 Sedler, supra note 17, at 113. See also Sedler, Characterization, identifica-
tion of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise
in Judicial Method, 2 RuTcEas-CAvmFN L.J. 8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Char-
acterization].
22 See text accompanying foonotes 43-54, supra.
23 484 S.W.2d at 829.24 Notes, supra note 4; B. CurTuE, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, in SELET ED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT or LAWS 3, 76 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Displacement]; Sedler, supra note 17, at 105; and Baade, Keating, supra
note 4.
25 Displacement, supra note 24.
20233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
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defendant was incorporated, to recover damages for an automobile
accident occurring in Saudi Arabia. Neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant offered any proof as to Saudi Arabian law. The facts
were such that plaintiff clearly made out a case of negligence, if
not recklessness, against the defendant. The court held that since
the tort occurred in Saudi Arabia, the plaintiff's "rights" if any,
"arose under Saudi Arabian law." The plaintiff had the burden
of showing that he had a "right" under the law of the locus of the
accident. Since he failed to prove that the law of the locus created
such a right he was thrown out of court. Professor Currie sharply
attacked the court's reasoning:
The most shocking aspect of the Walton decision is the
holding that Saudi Arabian law displaced the law of the
forum although the court presumably had no idea what the
relevant provisions of that law-if any-were. The application
of foreign law is justified when the law expresses a policy of
the foreign state, when the connections of the case with the
foreign state are such as to give it a legitimate interest in
having its policy applied, and when there is no conflicting
interest of the forum state. A court is not justified in holding
that foreign law displaces local law as the rule of decision
when it cannot make the determination that the interest of the
foreign state is entitled to recognition, and it can seldom
make that determination when it has no information con-
cerning the foreign law and policy.27
He thus argued that it was the business of the party seeking
application of the foreign law to bring to the attention of the
court those policies which support its application. However, in
Walton neither plaintiff nor defendant were New York domi-
ciliaries. What then was the presumptive reason for New York
to apply its own law? New York would not necessarily be ad-
vancing a "governmental interest" in applying its own law. To
this Professor Currie responded:
Grant that no governmental policy of New York respecting
the problem of personal injuries will be advanced by the
application of its law to a dispute between two foreigners
arising out of a collision in Saudi Arabia; grant also that
neither party regulated his conduct or planned his affairs
27 Displacement, supra note 24, at 48.
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with reference to New York law. The fact remains that there
is a law suit pending in a New York court. The harsh alterna-
tive to deciding it according to New York law is to dismiss
it. No conflict of interest among states being apparent, justice
between the parties becomes the sole consideration. Justice
between the parties requires a decision on the merits. And
where should the New York court look for a rule of decision
that will do justice between the parties but to the body of
principle and experience which has served that purpose, as
well as the ends of governmental policy, for the people of
New York in their domestic affairs? 28
One can hardly find fault with the Currie argument. But,
what relevance does it have to Foster? In Foster defendant
argued ably for the application of the Ohio host-guest statute.
Not only did he present the substance and tenor of the statute,
but he also sought to convince the court of the justice of applying
Ohio law to the case at bar. 9 Are we now to talk of the pre-
sumptive application of Kentucky law or the base law being
that of the forum? The Court is being asked to make a decision
as a matter of justice as to whether the law of Kentucky or Ohio
has greater claim to application given a certain set of facts. Why
can it not proceed to the business at hand, viz., logically reasoning
to the appropriate decision in the case? Where else in the law
do we find such talk as presumptively one rule applies unless you
can convince the court overwhelmingly that another rule ought
to apply? The presumption of innocence in a criminal case or
the presumption of non-liability in a civil case are instances where
a court insists on a certain degree of convincing before it will
change the status quo. But, here we have no status quo-we are
challenged with a question of justice. The defendant is arguing
that it is more just for the Ohio rule to govern this case. What
kind of answer is it to tell him that even if on balance we believe
he is right he has not done enough to "displace the law of the
forum"? He rather thought that it was the business of the courts
to decide on an appropriate substantive rule to govern his case.
Why, he may ask, are the courts hiding behind presumptions
when they should be deciding my case?
28 Id. at 65.29 Brief for Appellee at 4-8.
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Nothing substantiates my contention that the "interesters"
are involved in a rigid system of choice of law more than this
fall-back on the forum law as the base. It stands as a "brooding
omnipresence" to remind us all that here is "the law" not to be
driven away by finely tuned argumentation or sensitive balancing
of interstate policy considerations.
At an earlier stage in the development of interest analysis
methodology there was an answer to the question previously
posed. It was originally part of the theology of interest analysis
that once a state interest was made out by the forum the inquiry
was over-the forum had an obligation to apply its own law to
further its state interest.30 But we all know that the strongest
advocate of this aspect of the theology had a change of heart.
Professor Currie recognized that states with even a slight state
interest might under this approach be required to apply their
own law even when they well knew that another state's interest
was greater and more significant when opposed to their own
"interest." To prevent this exercise of state chauvinism Currie
backtracked and decided that a state might well interpret its own
state interest in a "moderate and restrained fashion" so as to take
into account interests and policies of sister states.31 Each state
would not then be required to read its law to apply to every fact
situation to which it could constitutionally stretch its law to gov-
ern. This process, as Professor Cavers has correctly noted, is the
equivalent of fashioning choice of law rules or approaches; for how
else will one determine whether in a given interstate fact pattern
one state's interest should be read moderately to avoid conflict
with the interest of another state.3 2 Professor Currie essentially
agreed but contended that there is a difference between a mod-
erate interpretation of forum law and fashioning choice of law
rules. I remain with others in the conflicts field 33 unconvinced
by Professor Currie's rebuttal:
•.. [T]hough the function is essentially the same, there is an
important difference between a court's construing domestic
30 Notes, supra note 4, at 183.
31 B. CurmiE, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS
oN =HE CoNF CT oF LAws 688-89 n.236 (1963); Third State, supra note 4, at
757-58.
32 Cavers, The Changing Choice of Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28
LAw & Co~r~mp. PROB. 732, 734 n.9 (1963).
33 Petersen, supra note 15, at 443.
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law with moderation in order to avoid conflict with a foreign
interest and its holding that the foreign interest is paramount.
When a court avowedly uses the tools of construction and
interpretation it invites legislative correction of error-or at
least criticism from the law reviews. When it weighs state
interests and finds a foreign interest weightier it inhibits
legislative intervention and confounds criticism.3 4
Whether one agrees with Currie or not, it is clear that having
given one the major premise-that a state must always apply its
law if it has an interest-he is now forced to a rather tenuous
argument to support the proposition that forum law is presump-
tively applicable. Forum law can only be presumed applicable
if a moderate reading of that law in an interstate setting still
requires a court to say that its interest is substantial. But, in a
case where the argument made by the party seeking foreign law
is that in this case a moderate interpretation of the forum law
would result in the application of foreign law, what value is
there in speaking of the presumptive application of forum law?
We must turn to the business at hand and face the issues the
parties are laying before the court.
After a century of fictions and mumbo jumbo the last thing
the law of conflicts needs is new stumbling blocks to logical and
persuasive reasoning. The presumption favoring forum law is
just such an obstacle. Indeed, even Professor Sedler, who has
championed the base law of the forum35 might inquire as to
whether this rule has not in fact harmed reasoned decision
making in the second of the Kentucky trilogy of cases, Arnett v.
Thompson."0 It will be recalled that in that case two Ohio resi-
dents, husband and wife, were involved in an automobile accident
in Kentucky. The wife sued her husband to recover damages for
her personal injuries. The husband, claiming the law of the State
of Ohio was applicable pleaded the Ohio guest statute and in
addition thereto pleaded the common law of Ohio which denied
the wife the right to sue her husband for a tort. The Kentucky
Court for the first time articulated its "enough contacts" rule
7
and found that the fact that the accident occurred in Kentucky
34 Third State, supra note 4, at 759.
35 Sedler, supra note 17, at 105.
SO 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
87 The Court stated the rule as follows:
(Continued on next page)
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provided a sufficient contact for Kentucky to apply its own law.
The Court in Arnett recognized that there was a substantial
argument for Ohio law to be dispositive of the case since the host
was covered by Ohio insurance and the immunity was designed
for Ohio spouses. The major policy reason or interest supporting
the application of Kentucky law was the "medical creditor"
rationale. Under this reasoning Kentucky has an interest to see
that, in accidents arising from the negligence of defendants in
Kentucky, the plaintiffs are compensated. The cost of providing
medical treatment in Kentucky should legitimately be met by
the tort-feasor. Professor Sedler has questioned the validity of
this interest and has made the rather common sense observation
that if two Kentucky residents injured in Ohio are entitled to
Kentucky law, perhaps two Ohio residents injured in Kentucky
are entitled to Ohio law.28
The Court's reasoning in Arnett indicates rather clearly that
the Court did not want to undertake weighing of interests in a
true conflict case. They made it quite clear that when there
were "enough contacts" with Kentucky its own law would govern.
But why this fear of weighing interests? Does it stem from the
Currie fear that it is inappropriate for courts to make those kinds
of decisions and that they impede legislative criticism?39 If I may
be excused some skepticism, I rather doubt that anything so
esoteric was on the Court's mind. I believe that the Kentucky
Court in Arnett felt that if the base law was that of the forum
then once the slightest "contact" or "interest" was made out then
it would become impossible to overcome the already existing
presumption favoring forum law. Given a tabula rasa the Court
might have written a good common sense choice of law decision
sensitively balancing the interests. The greatest gift the academic
commentators could give the courts is a green light to use their
own judicial instincts. We have burdened them with rules,
approaches and presumptions for long enough.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Upon further study and reflection the court has decided that the conflicts
question should not be determined on the basis of weighing of interests
but simply on the basis of whether Kentucky has enough contacts tojustify applying Kentucky law. Id. at 113.
88 Sedler, supra note 17, at 123. Professor Reese has taken a similar position
on Arnett v. Thompson. Reese, The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law: A
Critique, 61 Ky. L.J. 368 (1972).
89 Third State, supra note 4, at 759.
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Interests and Policy Gimmickry
The interest analysts brought to the field of conflicts brilliant
jurisprudential insights. Beyond doubt, their most important con-
tribution was the observation that one could not realistically
decide a conflicts case without some tolerable understanding
of the substantive content of the rules of law that were in sup-
posed conflict.40 The mechanical rules of the first Restatement
had imposed an automatic solution to a conflicts case without
regard to the content of the rules. With the interest analysis
approach, by scrutinizing the conflicting rules of law and the
policies embodied therein, we might determine that given the
facts of the case at bar, the policies might not really conflict.
This was the situation in Wessling v. Paris,41 the first case in
which Kentucky indicated that it had entered the new era in
choice of law. Two Kentucky residents took a trip from Louisville,
Kentucky across the Ohio River to New Albany, Indiana where
an auto accident occurred. The guest was injured due to the
negligence of the host who sought to defend on the grounds that
the Indiana host-guest rule applied. Plaintiff sought the applica-
tion of the common law negligence standards of Kentucky. The
decision was not a difficult one for policy-centered analysts. After
all, the primary reasons offered for the existence of special host-
guest statutes which limit liability are: (1) there is fear of col-
lusion by friendly hosts and guests against insurance companies
and (2) it is wrong for ungrateful guests to sue their hosts for
ordinary garden-variety negligence. Since both host and guest
were Kentucky residents, it hardly seemed proper for Indiana law
to govern the consequences of the host-guest relationship. The
parties were insured in Kentucky which had expressed its policy
that compensation was to be favored over the possibility of
collusion. As to the host-guest relationship and the possibility of
ingratitude, why should Indiana intrude on this Kentucky host-
guest relationship? Thus goes the standard argument. Had the
Kentucky Court focused only on the locus of the accident, Indiana
law would have controlled and liability would have been denied.
40 For this insight the credit must go to Professor David Cavers. His article,
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAzv. L. REV. 173 (1933),
remains one of the seminal pieces in conflicts literature.
41417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
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In Wessling the Kentucky Court followed an analysis similar to
this, although one could have hoped for greater precision in their
reasoning.42 Whether they have been true to the interest analysis
approach is a matter we shall shortly inquire into.
For all the brilliance which this approach signifies it suffers
from severe limitations. The first and most serious limitation is
that it is built on the belief that policy reasons behind statutes or
common law policies can be identified at a given point in time
with a fair degree of exactitude.43 In fact so confident are the
"interesters" of their policy analysis that they have prepared
elaborate charts in which they set forth variables which include
such factors as plaintiff's residence, defendant's residence, place
of accident and forum.44 They then attempt to work out the
various combinations in which conflict problems can arise. A
quick look at the chart will indicate whether we have a true or
false conflict on the basis of a given policy. It is all very scientific
and clinical. In most instances one need only feed the factors
into the IBM machine and out will pop the result. Even in the
difficult true conflict cases the choice for the court is sharply
delineated. Again, may I ask where else in the law have we been
treated to such a spectacle? For several years now I have toiled
with torts classes on the proximate cause issue. I am at the point
where I would welcome a chart. 'Tis a consummation devoutly
to be wished. Yet, I know that it is not to be. The factual shadings
of the cases are not given to charting. One cannot differentiate
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.45 from the Wagon Mound Cases46
on the basis of chartable factors. Sensitive evaluation of the
42 The case does not clearly set forth the interests or policies behind host-guest
rules. However, it is reasonable to assume, from the authorities cited by the Court
(both primary and secondary) that they were following standard interest analysis
as to what is considered a false conflict case.43 Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 459, 464 (1967); D. CAvEBs, THE CHOircE-
oF-LAw PRocEss 96-101 (1965); Reese, supra note 38, at 368.
44 See B. Cuun, Married Womans Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, in SrEcm EssAYs ON THE CoNsticT OF LAW-s 77, 84 (1963), and B.
Con=I, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, in SELEcTE EssAys ON THE CoNFLicT OF LAws 147 (1963). Professor
Sedler's most recent charting can be found in Sedler, Characterization, supra note
21, at 60.
45 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
46 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., [1961]
A.C. 388 (P.C.) (N.S.W.); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship
Co., 1 A.C. 617 (P.C.) (N.S.W.).
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factual patterns will result only where courts are willing to look
at a broad range of considerations. Is it plausible then to main-
tain that in choice of law cases we can decide questions of
incredible complexity-questions which raise the problem of
the appropriate allocation of law making responsibility in an
interstate setting-by focusing on one aspect viz. the legislative
or judicial policy behind a given rule?
The cavalier fashion with which courts and scholars alike have
dealt with the issue of territoriality and foreseeability is indicative
of the scope of the problem. These complex issues have been
relegated to a status of unimportance under the onslaught of
single minded interest analysis. The statement is almost legion
that "unfair surprise" rarely exists in a tort-conflict case.47 The
argument is a twofold one. First, it is argued that defendants
do not orient their activity or shape their conduct to take account
of rules of liability or of the measure of damages. Second, the
almost ubiquitous presence of insurance on the liability scene
supposedly makes the only relevant surprise not that of the prin-
cipal defendant but that of his insurer. Since insurance actuaries
do not base their rates in contemplation of conflicts problems
(which are so to speak "bizarre" occurrences), they cannot be the
beneficiaries of an "unfair surprise" argument for denial of
liability.4 8 This leads to the conclusion that when plaintiff has
made out a governmental interest in behalf of his recovery there
is little reason to deny it to him except in those rare instances
when the, "unfair surprise" argument would catch defendant
without adequate liability insurance.
An example of the narrowness of this brand of interest analysis
can be seen in a case coming from the Court of Appeals of New
47 COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 204-06; Weintraub, Response to the
Critiques of Professors Sedler, Twerski and Walker, 57 IowA L. REv. 1258, 1263
(1972); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law supra note 5,
at 310; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra
note 5, at 1591.
48 This argument is usually supported by a citation to Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J.
554 (1961). The now famous quote from that article ridiculing the foreseeability
argument states that:
[T]he theory. . . is tautological. The rules of liability are to be dictated
by insurance practices which are, in turn dictated by the rules of liability.
All that can be concluded from such a premise is that whatever is,
should be. Id. at 581-82.
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York. In Miller v. Miller49 a resident of New York, embarked on
a short business trip to Brunswick, Maine, where his brother
resided and where they had mutual business interests. Two days
after his arrival he went for a ride in a car owned by his sister-
in-law and driven by his brother. Mr. Miller was killed when
the vehicle suddenly swerved off the road and crashed into a
bridge railing. Some three months after the accident the de-
cedent's brother and sister-in-law, who had been Maine residents,
returned to reside in New York. Shortly thereafter, the decedent's
wife filed suit against the decedents brother and sister-in-law
for the wrongful death of her husband. The defendants raised
as a partial defense the $20,000 wrongful death limitation in
effect in Maine at the time of the accident. The New York law
permitted unlimited liability in wrongful death cases. Indulging
in some fanciful interest analysis the court found for plaintiff and
permitted unlimited liability recovery. It reasoned that New York
had a strong interest in protecting its domiciliaries (the decedents
family) so that they be adequately compensated for the loss of
the "bread-winner."
Having established a strong New York interest, the court set
about destroying Maine's interest in having its wrongful death
statute applied to the case at bar. The court reasoned that in
light of the possibility of unlimited liability in cases in which the
plaintiff was not killed it could not conclude that the Maine
defendant relied on the Maine wrongful death limitation in pur-
chasing inadequate insurance. With respect to the liability of
the insurer and its expectations, the court concluded that the
insurer must have expected that it might have to pay claims for
accidents outside of Maine in which the limited liability rule
would not apply. The court also found it to be relevant that the
defendant had moved to New York following the accident thus
diminishing any interest Maine might have in "regulating the
rights of its citizens" (protecting them from high speculative
wrongful death claims).
Query: Is it foreseeable that a Maine driver who was driving
his brother, a New York resident, in the State of Maine on a trip
that was to begin in Maine and was to end in Maine, would be
49 22 N.Y.2d 12, 287 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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subjected to the law of New York? To state the question is to
answer it. Yet, one may ask why is it important that one have
foreseeable law applied to his case? If indeed there is no reliance
by the defendant on the rule of law in advance of his actions
why should it matter that it was not foreseeable that foreign law
would apply? And what of the argument that since bizarre cases
are not taken into account in rating by insurance companies,
paying off a bizarre claim will not impose unfair surprise to them?
Justice Breitel speaking for the dissent in Miller v. Miller was
quite cognizant of the distinction between reliance and foresee-
ability. He argued that:
[I]t is jurisprudentially significant that parties' rights be de-
termined by the law or system of rules which they most prob-
ably believed would control their relationship. In this respect,
the application of the proper law of the tort exercises an influ-
ence in "promoting an unconscious acceptance of legality and
legal order." . . . In view of all the Maine elements in this
case, it is hard to deny that these parties would have felt that
Maine law controlled every aspect of their liability inter se
regarding a Maine accident during a trip occasioned by and
incidental to their mutual business in Maine. To this extent,
the law of the place of the wrong assumes significance, albeit
not that which it had under older territorial thinking involving
a mechanical, rigid and unacceptable approach, but to the
degree that the place of the wrong may reflect the conscious
understanding and choice of persistent localized activity of
the parties5" (emphasis added).
Not only is foreseeability important in the jurisprudential
sense, it bears careful scrutiny as a matter of pure substantive
law. Lest we forget, we are not only deciding a conflicts case, we
are also deciding a case involving tort liability. Plaintiff in Miller
was suing for the negligence of the defendant. The limited
liability question arose in the context of a negligence case and
the question concerned the appropriate amount of damages for
the negligent act of defendant. Does not the substantive law of
negligence, which is based so heavily on foreseeability, impose
constrictions on the fanciful imagination of judges in imposing
results in a conflicts case that are clearly outside the scope of
5o Id. at 28, 237 N.E.2d at 886-87, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48.
[Vol. 61
To WBmm DoEs Oim ATrAca THE HoRsEs?
foreseeability?51 Now it may well be argued that if we only
define these bizarre results as foreseeable, then for posterity they
will remain so, and that foreseeability is thus a foolish threshold
question 2 That argument has been made, but it is in this author's
opinion invalid. To understand the core concept of foreseeability
one must be "street wise." The common sense limitations which
Justice Breitel sought to impose on interest analysis stem from
a deep commitment to basic underlying concepts which pervade
tort law. There is no proximate cause case, no matter how
extraordinary the results, about which one could not say-"it is
within the scope of foreseeability." But to do so would destroy
foreseeability as a working legal concept in the law of torts. As
long as that concept remains central to tort law it must remain
central to conflicts law.
This argument goes to the contention of the foreseeability of
insurance companies as well. Let us assume for the moment that
we were litigating a purely domestic tort case and hypothecate
a "result outside the scope of the risk" of an insured defendant.
Would we dare say that an insurance company must pay the claim
since the result is "bizarre" and "bizarre" cases do not affect rating
standards? The insurer contracts to defend the insured and pay
if he is liable. The insurer is permitted to raise any defenses
that the insured could have raised. These contracts have not
been held to be against public policy, as yet. If the insured as
an individual would be permitted to raise the defense of proximate
cause, would it be a permissible argument in a domestic tort case
to say that such an argument is not available to the insurer? The
logic of those who have made this argument in the conflicts area
would support the reasoning that insurers only take into con-
51 The author can only refer the reader to the voluminous literature on
proximate cause. The scope of the risk theme is pervasive in that literature. See,
e.g., W. PRossEn, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 236 (4th ed. 1971).
52 See Morris, supra note 48, and ComcENTARY, supra note 6, at 204-06.
Professor Sedler, too, is prone to taking this circular argument seriously. In dis-
cussing the impact of state lines on a case like Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854(Pa. 1970), where defendant acted wholly within his state lines, Professor Sedler
argues that payig obeisance to state lines is wrong and that it is not necessarily
"'the price of federalism." It is only the price of federalism if we are willing to
pay it or if we attach independent significance to the state line. Sedler, supra note
4, at 401. The fallacy of that argument is the same fallacy that exists in Morris'
foreseeability argument. Certain values and concepts are part of our substantive
law. We are not writing on a blank tablet. The concepts are in the law and
manifest their presence in innumerable instances. We are not at liberty to
eviscerate them at will and then hope to have a cohesive legal system.
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sideration the incidence of claims not their foreseeability to the
insured. Perhaps this is good argument for doing away with the
foreseeability concept in tort and abolishing negligence as the
tool for tort compensation.53 But, we cannot temporize. We can-
not live in two legal worlds at the same time. The life of the law
is still logic, first and foremost. It does not take a shrewd observer
to note the profound impact of insurance on the development
of the law of torts. 4 But, the underlying concepts have remained
sound and true to the fundamentals upon which the common law
was built. To use the law of conflicts to eviscerate fundamental
tort law concepts is to compound confusion. It is to allow de-
cisions from the same court on the same day which cannot be
reconciled-either in letter or spirit.
This discussion of foreseeability and its impact on choice of
law is not meant in any sense to be definitive. It does, however,
exemplify the great complexity of a conflicts case. These kinds
of considerations cannot be adequately dealt with under standard
interest analysis. No theory, interest or gimmick will be an
adequate substitute for tough analytical thinking. Only close
attention to the factual pattern plus a solid grounding in the
underlying substantive law principles involved can yield a so-
phisticated result. It is not to be accomplished by charts and
diagrams. Interest analysis as presently expounded is a simplistic
tool which stands in the way of sensitive judicial evaluation of
complex issues of fact and law.
A Hard Look at Foster
What has all this to do with Foster? Much will depend on
our reading of the Foster decision. If the Court's statement means
that Kentucky law will apply any time there are "enough contacts"
with Kentucky without regard to whether they generate Kentucky
interests, then much of what the policy-centered analysts have
to say will be irrelevant.55 But, the Foster decision deserves an
53 The no-fault development in the past several years is designed to accom-
plish this result. See R. YKEON & J. O'CONNELL, BAsic PECTION FOR TE
TRAFFIC VicTrim: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMG AUToMOBILE INsuRANcE (1965).
54 It has, for example, expanded the proximate cause concept well beyond its
conservative beginnings. See R. KEEToN, LEGAL CAUSE IN T LAW OF ToaRTs
(1963).
65 There is little doubt that some will read the decision in this fashion.
Professor Reese's symposium article at 370 suggests that the Court may be saying
that contacts divorced from interests may now be sufficient in Kentucky.
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honest reading and I hardly think that the Court has come to the
conclusion that in a false conflict case it would apply Kentucky
law simply on the basis of contacts with the state, even where
those contacts don't generate interests. It has not as yet applied
Kentucky law to a case in which there were contacts but no
interests." If this be so, the major question left unanswered by
the "enough contacts" rule is-just how much is "enough" in the
context of a presumption which favors forum law unless it is
displaced?
To appreciate the dimensions of this question one need only
focus on one simple fact. Every citizen of Kentucky has at least
one contact with Kentucky. He is a Kentuckian or a Kentucky
domiciliary.5 7 Let us hypothecate a Kentucky plaintiff who has
gone to Ohio to spend the day with a close friend, a bona fide
Ohio resident. They decide to go golfing and on the way to the
golf course the Ohio host is negligent in driving his car injuring
his Kentucky guest. Assume further that by agreement the host
accepts service of process in Kentucky. The insurer now seeks
to raise the Ohio host-guest statute. The concern about col-
lusion, if anything, is buttressed by the fact that plaintiff and
defendant have already started their shenanigans in arranging
the Kentucky forum. This is not the "power-myth" of jurisdic-
tion58 operating since this is the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Kentucky courts based on one of the oldest forms of jurisdiction
-consent.
Is the plaintiffs domiciliary status in Kentucky a sufficient
interest or contact for Kentucky law to apply? If Kentucky will
allow compensation and Ohio will deny liability in the absence
of willful or wanton negligence, we have a true conflict. Will the
Kentucky Court focus on the domiciliary status of the plaintiff
56In Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968), the Court may have
come close to doing so. But, the place of the accident clearly retains rather
substantial interests. See D. CAvEs, supra note 7.57 Seidelson Comment on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 9 DUQuESNE L. Rlv. 423,
428-24 (1971), 6s put it very well:
The essence of that interest, which made Pennsylvania "a concerned juris-
diction," presumably was a concern that one of its domiciliaries, injured
and uncompensated, might become an indigent ward of the state. To
the extent that the concern represents a legitimate interest on the part of
Pennsylvania, it suggests just how broadly interest may be defined in
interest analysis. After all, everyone has to be domiciled somewhere.
58 Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction; The "Power"
Mlth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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to allow for recovery? It would not take an over-expansive
reading of the Kentucky cases to conclude that Kentucky's com-
pensation interest could be deemed sufficient. Interest analysis
per se provides no method for differentiating the fact pattern of
a true Ohio defendant who is acting solely within his home town
and a quasi-Ohio defendant driving a Kentucky plaintiff through
Ohio on a U.S. highway. The reason that it cannot give meaning
to these factual nuances is clear enough. In order to define the
purposes behind the statutes or. common law rules it must ques-
tion what are the general purposes behind them. It thus must
develop such interests as compensation, fear of collusion, etc.
When one attempts to invoke the judicial method to apply these
purposes to the facts of a particular conflicts case, serious prob-
lems arise. The goals are gross-they are not finely tuned to
factual patterns and it is almost impossible to do so within the
confines of a particular conflicts case.
Many conflicts scholars have attempted to address themselves
to this problem. They have recognized that such finely tuned
concepts as foreseeability and territoriality have an impact even
under an interest analysis approach, but they have had a hard
time rationalizing the reason for the impact.59 Professor Wein-
traub, a devotee of interest analysis has taken the position that
in the case I have postulated where the Ohio resident has an
accident while driving the plaintiff, a Kentuckian, on a purely
local Ohio trip that Ohio law should govern. He argues that
plaintiff's residence should not assert its compensation interest
unless either the defendant or the defendant's course of injurious
conduct has some nexus with the plaintiff's residence that makes
it reasonable for the residence to pursue its compensation in-
terest.60
Professor Weintraub is obviously straining to find some
method of limiting the impact of interest analysis. The problem
with attempting to do it on the basis of the nexus that the
defendant has developed with the plaintiff's domicile is that it
does not affect the interest involved one whit. The interests have
already been defined by Professor Weintraub and others as the
59 Weintraub, supra note 47, at 1261. Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on
the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts, 57 IowA L. REv. 1229, 1285 (1972),
and Sedler, supra note 4, at 407.
60 Weintraub, supra note 47, at 1261.
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desire of the domiciliary state to make sure that its favorite son
does not go uncompensated. There is just no way that the com-
pensation interest will disappear. It will not do to say that the
plaintiff's home state should not seek to assert its interest. One
must ask why. The answer must be that defendant could not
foresee such a result in the context of his actions. If foreseeability
is a factor it must be dealt with realistically and honestly.(' It is
a value which stands on its own merit. If foreseeability has stand-
ing as an issue in a conflicts case it must be due to some inherent
feeling that, interests aside, there are cases where the results of
applying one state's law are so unforeseeable that it would be
wrong to do so. For this writer it leads to the conclusion that even
in false conflicts cases the fact pattern of a particular case may
be such that applying another state's law may be outside the
realm of foreseeability.62 Courts and scholars alike will have to
come to grips with this question sooner or later. The attention
paid to "interests" has been so intense that conflicts literature has
not faced the other values which are and must be a part of the
choice-of-law scene.
In some cases the foreseeability problem can become most
extreme. Barrett v. Foster Grant Co. 63 raises the problem in a
striking manner. Foster Grant was a Delaware corporation which
had its principal place of business in Massachusetts. It purchased
in Massachusetts from the Massachusetts Electric Company several
transformers to reduce transmission voltage of 13,800 volts, the
"high" side, to 550 volts, the "low" side. The transformers were
oil cooled and it was necessary periodically to change or recon-
dition the oil. For the first several years this service was per-
formed by Massachusetts Electric Company, the seller of the
Gl The contradiction faced by Professor Weintraub is substantial. One need
only recall his views denigrating the importance of foreseeability and "unfair
surprise" on choice-of-law in torts. His position was that unfair surprise to an
insurer was nonsense. COMMENTARY, supra note 6, at 206. Yet when faced with
the prospect of compensating a plaintiff for an accident caused by the defendant
wholly within his own home state, Professor Weintraub falls back on an unfairness
type argument which can only have its base in a foreseeability approach. CoM-
mENTAY, supra note 6, at 247-49. He cannot have it both ways. Either foresee-
ability is or is not a factor to be reckoned with. This criticism has validity in
contract choice-of-law problems as well. The question there again is whether
territorial contacts have independent significance. See Twerski, Choice-of-Law in
Contracts-Some Thoughts on the Weintraub Approach, 57 IowA L. Ruv. 1239(1972).
62 Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 3, at 380, 385.
03450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1971).
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transformers. Later, Transformer Service, a New Hampshire
corporation approached defendant, Foster Grant, regarding a
better technique it had developed for changing the oil. Under
the old method the transformers had to be closed down for several
hours, thus interrupting plant operation. Under the method
devised by Transformer Service the oil could be reconditioned
without shutting down operations. Part of Transformer Service's
sales pitch was that it had well trained personnel who could
accomplish this job safely. Foster Grant contracted with Trans-
former Service to do the reconditioning. There is no question of
Transformer Service's independent contractor status under the
above stated contractual arrangement.
Fourteen years of service passed without problems. In 1968
plaintiff Barrett, an employee of Transformer Service and a New
Hampshire resident, while connecting a hose, came in contact
with a bare uninsulated lead wire on the high side of the trans-
former and suffered severe burns necessitating the amputation
of his right forearm. On appeal the threshold question faced by
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was whether Massachusetts
or New Hampshire law would govern.64 The danger of the unin-
sulated wire was an open and obvious one to which the plaintiff
had been alerted. Massachusetts law was clear-a landowner owes
the employee of an independent contractor a duty to warn only
of hidden dangers. He does not owe a general duty of reasonable
care. There is a respectable argument to the effect that New
Hampshire has expanded the duty of a landowner under these
circumstances to do more than just warn but to undertake reason-
able steps to obviate the danger.
How would the Kentucky Court handle this type of problem?
Would they say that plaintiff's domiciliary status is enough com-
bined with the presumption in favor of foreign law to apply the
favorable law of plaintiff's domicile? Professor Sedler has already
indicated that he believes Barrett is a hard case6 5 and the result
64 The court reversed the finding of the United States District Court in New
Hampshire. Apparently the choice of law issue was raised for the first time on
appeal, since there is no mention of the issue in the District Court opinion. See
Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 321 F. Supp. 784 (N.H. 1970).65 Sedler, The Last Treatise, 50 TExAs L. REv. 1064, 1076-77 n.51 (1972),
reviewed R. WEiNTRATJB, COMmENTARY ON THE Cos =rc or LAws (1971);
Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts,
supra note 59, at 1238 n.45.
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is supportable only because the defendant relied on Massachusetts
law. With all due deference to Professor Sedler, I believe that
his analysis is close to outrageous. If a Massachusetts corporation
acts within its own state in a totally localized fashion and is
charged with a property tort then Massachusetts law should apply.
One need not assert that the Massachusetts corporation has con-
formed its behavior to Massachusetts law. It is most probably a
myth in this case. One need only recognize that unforeseeable
tort liability is an aberration of negligence law. My view not-
withstanding, if one attempts to gauge how the Kentucky Court
would deal with such a case, one must admit that given the
present framework of "enough contacts" it is far from clear that
plaintiff's domiciliary status would not be sufficient for the
application of its own law. The Court might just agree with
Professor Sedler, and it is not unfair to prognosticate that if the
Kentucky Court finds a hard case because of strong local interest,
forum law will prevail.
The independence of the foreseeability-territoriality issue can
be made even clearer if we postulate one minor change in
Barrett v. Foster Grant Co. This time instead of the defendant
being a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Massachusetts let us suppose that it is a New Hampshire
corporation with its principal place of business in New Hampshire
but that it maintains a branch plant in Massachusetts. Now with
both plaintiff and defendant being New Hampshire domiciliaries
would conflict scholars treat the case as a false conflict? Pre-
sumably one could argue that Massachusetts still has an interest
to attract business to its state by the imposition of less restrictive
tort liability. But realistically the argument is nonsense. It is high
time to stop making up fairy tale stories about non-existent
interests for the consumption of conflicts students. Whatever
reasons a New Hampshire corporation has for setting up a plant
in Massachusetts one can be assured that impending tort liability
is not one of them. It would seem that in this case one must
finally come to grips with the crucial issue. Is there a territorial
dimension to the law of conflicts? If there is, "conflicts justice"
will call for Massachusetts law to apply. The fact that the case




Again I fear that Kentucky placed in the position of New
Hampshire would say that there are certainly enough contacts
to apply its own law. If contacts mean interests, and interests
only, then Kentucky may in fact be the true disciple of Professor
Brainard Currie at the earliest stage of his thinking on choice of
law. 6 His later moderating views made allowance for balancing
interests (although he would not call it that), taking into account
interstate considerations. Having traversed the long trail from
the first Restatement to a thoughtful and analytical approach to
choice of law, I can only hope that the Kentucky Court will not
cast its lot with rigid interest analysis. Should the court follow
this rigid approach, it would be trading in the best of its judicial
instincts for a wooden rule. And, as with the townsman in the
apocryphal story I related earlier, it would be seeking to "attach
the horses" to modem turbine engines.
66 Notes, supra note 4.
